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Abstract
In the tradition of Irving Fisher, the current article advocates an approach
to dynamic programming that is based upon elementary aggregating func-
tions where current action and future expected payoff combine to yield
overall current payoff. Some regularity properties are provided on the ag-
gregator which allow for establishing the existence, the uniqueness and the
computation of the Bellman equation. Some order-theoretic foundations
for such aggregators are also established. The aggregator line of argument
encompasses and generalizes many previous results based upon additive
or non-additive recursive payoff functions.
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1. Introduction
Dating from Stokey & Lucas with Prescott [19], dynamic programming tech-
niques and the Bellman principle of optimality have become the cornerstone
of the analysis of most of intertemporal equilibria, the main rationale for this
popularity being the associated possibility of analyzing complicated infin-
ite horizon problems through a sequence of stationary two-period problems,
formalized by Bellman equation. Even though this commonly requires some
stationary structure on the original optimization problem, the suitability of
this approach for numerical tools has made it increasingly popular by the
last decade.
Many authors have been interested in the mathematical properties of the
Bellman equation, and have in particular provided conditions answering the
three main questions related to Bellman equation, i.e., the existence, the
uniqueness and the computation of its solutions. To the best knowledge of
the authors, the notion of recursive intertemporal payoff have always played
a central role in the analysis of such concerns. Consider an agent who is
to take some decision zt in some action set Z at each date t ∈ N. An in-
tertemporal payoff function then associates to every action stream
˜
z in ZN
some payoff U(
˜
z), so that the preferences of the agent, defined on ZN, are
represented by U . Within such a framework, U is recursive if the intertem-
poral payoff from today, formally U(
˜
z) = U(z0, z1, . . . , zn, . . .), is a function
A(z0, U(z1, . . . , zn, . . .)) of the action today z0 and the intertemporal payoff
from tomorrow U(z1, . . . , zn, . . .). The function A aggregates the current
action z and the future payoff into the current payoff, and is commonly
labelled as an aggregating function, or aggregator.
Formally, two classes of approaches have been retained to deal with recursive
payoffs: the first, initiated by Koopmans1[8], provides an axiomatization of
preferences which leads to a recursive payoff function. The second is to take
the aggregator function as a primitive, and then to provide conditions under
which there exists some recursive payoff (e.g., Stokey & Lucas [18], Becker
& Boyd [2], Streufert [21], Le Van & Vailakis [10]).2
A first objective of our contribution is to initiate a new approach: the pref-
erences of the agents are solely defined on the set of couples (z, v), where
z is an action today and v is a future payoff. This contribution introduces
an axiomatization of preferences under which some well-behaved aggregat-
ors represent such preferences. Well-behaved means that the aggregator is
endowed with some minimal structure—called uniform continuity in v—
allowing for answering the three main questions mentioned related to the
Bellman equation.
The use of dynamic programming techniques however requires to be able to
define an infinite-horizon intertemporal payoff, starting from an aggregator
A that it is only defined for two periods. This can be accomplished in two
different ways: the first one, that is standard, is to associate to A a recursive
payoff, when it exists. A second, natural and currently retained approach,
is to extend A to finite-horizon models by iterated backward induction and
then to infinite-horizon models by a simple limit process3.
1This approach is presented in Becker & Boyd (see Section 3.3.1. in [2]).
2In Yao [22], the aggregator and the recursive payoff are taken together as primitives.
3This way of defining the intertemporal payoff is considered in Le Van & Vailakis [10].
The framework adopted by these authors implies that this payoff function is recursive,
while this is not necessarily the case in our framework.
1
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A second objective of this contribution is then to compare the two orders
defined on ZN by these two distinct kinds of payoffs. The use of a recursive
payoff function may reveal as being inappropriate in some given configur-
ations: even when it exists, the orders that are induced on ZN by such a
recursive payoff and by the aggregator may differ, and the associated optim-
ization programs may have different solutions and different value functions.
In a nutshell, the class of aggregators currently introduced answers to the
questions related to the Bellman equation. They are further grounded upon
a class of preferences over Z × R, instead of the usual and complex spe-
cification over ZN. This may admittedly be considered as more natural and
realistic an answer: there is indeed little doubt that it is extremely demand-
ing to assume that agents are able to optimize over a set of infinite action
sequences. Along the same range of ideas, a preference relationship over
Z ×R is simpler and more testable than a preference relationship over ZN.
A third objective of this contribution is to encompass models with possibly
unbounded payoffs. The use of dynamic programming tools for additively
separable models with unbounded payoffs was first initiated by Boyd [3],
Alvarez & Stokey [1], Duran [4] and Le Van & Morhaim [9]. To summarize,
four distinct approaches have been proposed in this framework to deal with
the issues related to dynamic programming. First, it is possible to use the
Banach contraction theorem (or some extension of it) applied to the Bell-
man operator: for the bounded case in the seminal work by Stokey & Lucas
with Prescott [19], and for the possibly unbounded case, Rincon-Zapatero &
Rodriguez-Palmero [15] or Martins-da-Rocha & Vailakis [13] have proposed
extensions involving local contractions. Second, a direct approach can be
used, and requires some lipschitz condition on the aggregator (see Le Van
& Morhaim or Le Van & Vailakis [10].). Third, it is possible to replace the
lipschitz condition by a topological property (biconvergence assumption) on
the recursive payoff function and the feasibility set (Streufert [20, 21]). Last,
the order-theoretic fixed-point machinery can be used to replace the Banach
fixed-point theorem (Kamihigashi [6]). These approaches are sometimes
connected, and each one may have some advantages from some particu-
lar point of view: Kamihigashi [6] allows to avoid topological assumptions,
and encompasses the existence and uniqueness part of Rincon-Zapatero &
Rodriguez-Palmero [15] and Martins-da-Rocha & Vailakis [13]’s results. But
it is only valid for additive separable models, and its assumptions may be
difficult to check. Streufert’s biconvergence assumption is singular in the
literature in the sense that it does not imply nor is implied by the other
results: a reason is that the biconvergence assumption guarantees that the
infinite-horizon payoffs can be approximated by finite-horizon payoffs, this
allows to recover some compactness property which is very useful for exist-
ence problems in dynamic programming. Usually, the Banach fixed-point
theorem is the way to solve such compactness issues.
This contribution unifies most of these papers (in particular Streufert [20,
21], Kamihigashi [7] or Le Van & Vailakis [9]). Such unification requires to
introduce a weak continuity assumption on the aggregator (assumption that
generalizes uniform continuity in v). This allows, together with a transvers-
ality condition, to ensure the existence and the uniqueness of a fixed-point
for the Bellman operator. This also provides an algorithm to reach the value
function starting from a suitable initial function.
This article is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces aggregators and
definitions of the payoffs. Section 3 details comparison between the aggreg-
2
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ator approach and the more standard one based upon a recursive payoff
function. Section 4 establishes that the value function of the aggregator-
based optimization problems is the unique fixed point for the Bellman op-
erator in a given length, and that this value function can be computed by
iterating the Bellman operator, starting from some initial condition. The
main proofs are gathered in a final appendix.
2. Aggregating Functions
2.1 Aggregators and Definitions of the Payoffs
Time is discrete. Consider some entity, be it an agent, a firm, a player
or a decision maker, that can choose to undertake actions z at each date
t ∈ N in some action set Z and anticipates the aggregate payoff v at the
beginning of time t + 1. Assume v ∈ R, where R denotes the extended
real line along R∪ {−∞,+∞}. The preferences of the entity are modelized
through a binary relationship on Z ×R: (z, v) is preferred to (z′, v′) if the
entity prefers to choose z today, and receive a future payoff of v, rather
than choosing z′ today and receiving a future payoff of v′. For convenience,
these preferences are modelled through a function,4 i.e., it is assumed that
there exists a function of (z, v) that represents the order relationship. Such
an aggregating function, referred to as an aggregator, shall henceforth be
considered as a primitive and is defined as follows.
Definition 2.1. An aggregator is a mapping
A : Z ×R→ R,
where Z is called an action set.
For every current action z and every future payoff v ∈ R, A(z, v) aggregates
the current action z and the future payoff v into one current payoff. The
two following assumptions will be retained through the whole exposition:
Assumption IM.— [Increasing Monotonicity] ∀z ∈ Z, u→ A(z, u) is non-
decreasing.
Assumption B.— [Boundary] A(z, ·) satisfies A(z,−∞) = −∞ for every
z ∈ Z and A(z,+∞) = +∞ for every z ∈ Z.
When it makes sense, the following convention shall further be used:
Convention I.— [Infinity] +∞− (+∞) = 0 and −∞− (−∞) = 0.
In Stokey & Lucas [18], Streufert [20], [21], Le Van & Vailakis [10], Rincon-
Zapatero & Rodriguez-Palmero [16] or Da Rocha & Vailakis [14], the ag-
gregating function A was uniformly defined on Z ×R. Within the current
configuration, however, it can be extended to a function on Z ×R→ R by
letting A(z,+∞) = limv→+∞A(z, v) and A(z,−∞) = limv→−∞A(z, v)—
such a limit exists in R as a result of the retainment of the Increasing
Monotonicity assumption IM—. This simple line of argument proves that
considering aggregators as functions from Z×R to R encompasses the case
where A : Z ×R→ R.
4For example, if Z is a normed vector space, and the preferences are reflexive, complete,
transitive and continuous, such a function is insured to exist from Debreu Representation
Theorem.
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Assumption UC.— [Uniform continuity] The mapping A is said to be uni-
formly continuous in v if for every ε > 0, there exists η > 0 such that for
every (z, v) ∈ Z ×R, for every η′ ∈ [−η, η], |A(z, v + η′)−A(z, v)| ≤ ε.
Remark 2.1. It may well happen that A(z, v+η) = A(z, v) = +∞, especially
if v = +∞. For such a conjunction and relying on Convention I, ∣∣A(z, v +
η)−A(z, v)∣∣ is interpreted to be 0 in the above Uniform Continuity property.
Thus, whenever A(z, v) = +∞ for (z, v) ∈ Z ×R, Uniform Continuity in v
implies that for η small enough, A(z, v + η) = +∞—a similar occurrence is
available for v = −∞—.
Lemma 2.1.— A mapping A will be uniformly continuous in v if and only
if there exists a function δ : R → R that tends to 0 at 0 and such that, for
every (z, v, v′) ∈ Z ×R×R, |A(z, v)−A(z, v′)| ≤ δ(v − v′).
In contradistinction with the tradition based upon strong regularity condi-
tions on a benchmark additive aggregator that is linear with respect to the
future payoff, the current generalized class of aggregators will refer to some
weak form of continuity that does not involve any topological property of Z
or X. The aggregator is indeed uniformly continuous in v if, given z ∈ Z
and ε > 0, one can find η > 0 small enough, independent of v ∈ R, such that
modifying the future payoff v of less than η does not change the total payoff
A(z, v) of more than ε. Interestingly and from Lemma 2.1, uniform continu-
ity in v clearly encompasses the case where A is λ-lipschitz with respect to
v for some λ > 0 as a special case for which the function δ(·) simplifies to
δ(v) = λ|v|.
Example 2.1. (A class of bounded and possibly discontinuous aggregators)
For the purpose of this example, temporarily assume that Z is a compact
topological space. The aggregator A : Z × R → R being allowed to be
discontinuous5, let (z, v, v′) ∈ Z × R2 → A(z, v) − A(z, v′) be continuous
under Convention I. Then A is uniformly continuous in v. Indeed, there
would otherwise exist ε > 0 and a sequence (zn, vn, wn) ∈ Z ×R×R with
|A(zn, vn)− A(zn, wn)| ≥ ε and such that |vn − wn| converges to 0 when n
tends to +∞. By compactness, it can be assumed that (zn, vn, wn) converges
to some (z, v, v) ∈ Z ×R×R, and by continuity, it derives that |A(z, v)−
A(z, v)
∣∣ = 0 ≥ ε, a contradiction. An example of such an aggregator is
A(z, v) = u(z) + f(v), for u any function from Z to R and f : R → R
continuous, non-decreasing with bounded values.
Example 2.2. (A class of separable aggregators satisfying a uniform con-
tinuity condition) Assume that Z is any set and let A(z, v) = u(z) + f(v)
for some function u from Z to R, and f : R → R a non-decreasing
and uniformly continuous function.6 Extend A on Z × R by A(z,+∞) =
limv→+∞A(z, v), and A(z,−∞) = limv→−∞A(z, v). Then A is obviously
uniformly continuous in v. Remark that, even though, this class also cov-
ers the case where A(z, v) = u(z) + f(v) for some lipschitz mapping f , f
above needs not to be lipschitz: consider, e.g., A(z, v) =
√
v − z2 if v ≥ 0
and A(z, v) = −z2 otherwise. It is well known that √v is not lipschtiz on
[0,+∞[, yet it is uniformly continuous.
5The space R is endowed with its standard compacification-topology: a neighbourhood
of x ∈ R is standard, and a neighbourhood of +∞ contains some ]y,+∞] for some y ∈ R,
a similar occurence being available for −∞.
6This means that, for every ε > 0 there exists η > 0 such that for every (v, v′) ∈ R×R
such that |v − v′| ≤ η, it derives that |f(v)− f(v′)| ≤ ε.
4
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2.2 A Class of Preorders that can be represented by Ag-
gregators satisfying the Building Assumptions
As this is soon to be clarified and thanks to the class of Lipschitz preorders
introduced by Levin [11], one can actually exhibit some class of preorders
which are representable by aggregators satisfying the just introduced Uni-
form Continuity property7.
For the purpose of this subsection and in order to save space on the argu-
ment, it is temporarily assumed that A is bounded from below and that the
future payoff v cannot take infinite values.
Let  be a complete preorder8 on E = Z ×R the set of actions and future
payoffs. Recall that, for every (e, e′) ∈ E × E, the strict preference ≺
associated with  is defined by e ≺ e′ if e  e′ and e′  e. Moreover,
the preorder  on E = Z × R is said to be increasing in v if for every
z ∈ Z, v ≤ v′ implies (z, v)  (z, v′). Lastly, a representation of  is a
function A : Z ×R → R such that for every e, e′ ∈ E, e  e′ is equivalent
to A(e) ≤ A(e′).
The notion of chain plays a crucial role in the following representation result.
For every (z, v) and (z′, v′) in Z ×R, define C((z, v), (z′, v′)) the set of all
chains from (z, v) to (z′, v′), i.e.,
C((z, v), (z′, v′)) =
{
((zi, vi))
n
i=0 : n ∈ N, (z0, v0) = (z, v), (zn, vn) = (z′, v′)
}
and for any chain ((zi, vi))
n
i=0 ∈ C((z, v), (z′, v′)), let I≺ be the set of indexes
i for which the sequence (zi, vi) is strictly decreasing between i − 1 and i,
i.e., I≺ = {i ∈ {1, ..., n} : (zi, vi) ≺ (zi−1, vi−1)}.
Theorem 2.1.— Let (Z, d) be a metric space and  be a complete preorder
on E = Z ×R,
(i) Assume that, for every (z, v) and (z′, v′) in Z ×R such that (z′, v′) ≺
(z, v), there is a α > 0 such that for any chain ((zi, vi))
n
i=0 from (z, v)
to (z′, v′), one has9
∑
i∈I≺ [d(zi, zi−1) + |vi − vi−1|] ≥ α. Then there
exists an aggregator A which represents  and is uniformly continuous
in v.
(ii) Moreover, if  is increasing in v, then A satisfies Increasing Monoton-
icity.
The quantity
∑
i∈I≺ [d(zi, zi−1) + |vi − vi−1|] ≥ α could be seen as a topo-
logical and order-theoretic measure of decreasingness along the chain. The
condition of the theorem says that this measure should be bounded below by
some strictly positive constant, for every chain starting at (z, v) and ending
at (z′, v′) with (z′, v′) ≺ (z, v).
Remark 2.2. For example, orders such as the lexicographic one do not fulfill
the condition of Theorem 2.1. Consider indeed the case where Z = R and
7This echoes the result of Koopmans, as presented in Becker & Boyd (see Section 3.3.1.
in [2]) on the representation of a preorder defined on ZN by some recursive payoff U (see
Definition 3.2) associated to some aggregator. Our representation result is about preorders
defined on Z ×R, the domain of the aggregator.
8A preorder is a reflexive and transitive binary relation.
9A distance δ can be defined on E by δ((z, v), (z′, v′)) = d(z, z′)+ | v − v′ |. The
assumptions on  in the theorem are those of a δ-Lipschitz preorder (Levin [11]). Remark
that this representation result is true whatever is the distance δ on E.
5
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let  denote the lexicographic order on Z × R. The assumption above
would therein fail to be satisfied: if one takes (z, v) = (0, 1) and (z′, v′) =
(0, 0), then (z′, v′) ≺ (z, v). Taking a chain from (z, v) to (z′, v′) with an
intermediary couple (ε, 0) with ε > 0, and since (0, 1) ≺ (ε, 0), the measure
of decreasingness along this chain is d((0, 0), (ε, 0)) = ε which is arbitrarily
small, contradicting the assumption of Theorem 2.1.
3. Aggregators versus Recursive Payoff
Functions
3.1 Aggregator-based Payoff Functions
It has been shown that A(z0, v) aggregates the current action z0 and the
future payoff v into one current payoff at the current date t = 0. In a
similar way, if some action zi, for i = 0, 1, is undertaken at time i, and given
a future payoff v ∈ R at date t = 2, the aggregate payoff at t = 0 can be
written in an overlapped way according to A(z0, A(z1, v)). Iterating and for
every sequence
˜
z = (zt)t∈N in ZN, every T ∈ N∗ and every v ∈ R, define
AT
(
˜
z, v
)
= A
(
z0, A
(
z1, A
(
z2, . . . , A
(
zT−2, A
(
zT−1, v
)) · · · )))
as the aggregate payoff at t = 0, given actions z0, . . . , zT−1 of the entity at
dates t = 0, . . . , T − 1 and a future payoff v at date t = T .
Define S : ZN → ZN as the shift operator, i.e., S(z0, z1, . . .) = (z1, z2, . . .).
The expression S(
˜
z) simply features the sequence of actions given by
˜
z from
time t = 1 on. More generally, iterating, SN (
˜
z) = (zN , zN+1, . . .) denotes
the sequence of actions
˜
z from time t = N on.
For the current unbounded time domain and T → +∞, a natural guess how-
ever emerges as the relevant function that should be maximized over time
by the entity. An enlightening hint at this issue is provided by the consider-
ation of a benchmark aggregator that is separably additive between current
action and future payoff and further linear with respect to this latter one,
i.e., A(z, v) = u(z) + βv, where u(·) is some instantaneous felicity function
and β ∈ ]0, 1[ some discount factor. It is traditional in economics to maxim-
ize the infinite sum
∑+∞
t=0 β
tu(zt), for
˜
z = (zt)t∈N sequence of actions over
time ; from the current perspective, this is nothing but the limit of the feli-
city truncated after some finite time T , i.e., limT→+∞
∑T
t=0 β
tu(zt). Within
the current setting, it can admittedly be written as limT→+∞AT (
˜
z, 0). It is
nonetheless worth emphasizing that such a limit may not exist, in which case
it is standard to maximize either the supremum limit—optimistic point of
view—or the infimum limit—pessimistic point of view—. This whole range
of considerations motivates the following definitions:
Definition 3.1. Given a sequence of actions
˜
z:
(i) the intertemporal payoff is limT→+∞AT (
˜
z, 0).
(ii) the upper payoff is w(
˜
z) = limT→+∞AT (
˜
z, 0).
(iii) the lower payoff is w(
˜
z) = limT→+∞AT (
˜
z, 0).
Remark that, even though the payoff from time N may not exist for some
˜
z, the upper and lower payoffs would keep on being well-defined in R.
6
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3.2 Recursive Payoff Functions
The previous section introduced aggregator functions as the sole primitive
for preferences over Z×R, i.e., on the set of couples that build from current
actions and future payoffs. The conventional way of modelizing intertem-
poral preferences is however to rather consider a preference relationship
. on the set ZN of action sequences. Generally speaking, this relation-
ship is represented through some function U : ZN → R, i.e., for every
(
˜
z,
˜
z′) ∈ ZN×ZN, one has
˜
z .
˜
z′ ⇔ U(
˜
z) ≤ U(
˜
z′). An articulation between
such an approach and the current aggregator one is nonetheless available
from the notion of recursive payoff :
Definition 3.2. Given an aggregator A : Z × R → R, a payoff function
U : ZN → R, is said to be recursive if
∀
˜
z ∈ ZN, U(
˜
z
)
= A
(
z0, U
(
S
(
˜
z
)))
.
This definition captures the idea of stationarity of preferences over time, U
being let unaffected by the passage of time—described by the shift operator
S—over a sequence of actions. In light of such an articulation, this whole
section will try to circumscribe a core matter: can the consideration of
aggregator as the sole primitive be argued to allow for a proficient approach
that allows for simpler and neater concepts that the standard one invoking
a recursive payoff function?
3.3 Preference Orders associated to the Payoffs
In order to reach a neater understanding of the relationship between an
aggregator and a recursive payoff function, consider an iteration of the re-
cursive equation followed by U and A, that delivers
U
(
˜
z
)
= AT
(
˜
z, U
(
ST (
˜
z)
))
.
Whence, potentially, the satisfaction of
(3.1) U(
˜
z) = lim
T→+∞
AT (
˜
z, 0)
on some particular subset of ZN, e.g., in order to insure that U(ST (
˜
z)) tends
to 0 when T tends to +∞, and for some particular classes of aggregators A
possessing sufficient regularity. Even though this is for example the approach
followed by Le Van & Vailakis [10], it appears as being quite restrictive, for
this imposes strong regularity conditions—close from Lipschitz ones—on A.
From a general perspective, the obtention of the Equality 3.1 for any
˜
z is
plainly out of reach. Indeed, and as this is now to going to be illustrated,
the discrepancy between the two may come to other dimensions, for even
the orders on ZN that are respectively induced by U and A may result in
being distinct ones.
Following Convention I when these limits are not finite, an aggregator A
defines two distinct preference relationships -A and -A on ZN along:
∀(
˜
z,
˜
z′
) ∈ ZN × ZN,
˜
z-A˜
z′ ⇔ limT→+∞AT
(
˜
z, 0
) ≤ limT→+∞AT (
˜
z′, 0
)
,
∀(
˜
z,
˜
z′
) ∈ ZN × ZN,
˜
z-A
˜
z′ ⇔ limT→+∞AT
(
˜
z, 0
) ≤ limT→+∞AT (
˜
z′, 0
)
.
7
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Assuming that A is associated with a recursive payoff function U defined
on ZN, a preference relationship -U can parallelly be introduced on ZN as
follows
∀(
˜
z,
˜
z′
) ∈ ZN × ZN,
˜
z -U
˜
z′ ⇔ U(
˜
z
) ≤ U(
˜
z′
)
.
Even though, upon the satisfaction of Equation 3.1, the three above orders
are identical, they can be distinct in the general case. The following pro-
position proves that in some situations, working with A, and -A or -A,
to represent preferences could be very different than the classical choice of
working with U and -U , this latter order failing to rank constant sequences
whilst -A and -A would instead provide decisive criteria.
Proposition 3.1.— The orders -A and -A (induced by the aggregator A)
and the order -U (induced by a recursive payoff function U associated to A)
can differ.
Proof. Let Z = R, A(z, v) = v/2+1/2− (z)2 if v < 1, A(z, v) = v+1− (z)2
otherwise. Moreover, A(z,+∞) = +∞ and A(z,−∞) = −∞. First, it is
easily derived that:
An(z0, ..., z0, 0) =
n∑
k=1
1
2k
+ z0
n−1∑
k=0
1
2k
for every z0 ≤ 0. In particular,
lim
n→+∞A
n(0, 0) = 1
where 0 denotes the null sequence, and
lim
n→+∞A
n(−1, 0) = −1
where −1 denotes the constant sequence whose terms are all equal to −1.
Similarly:
lim
n→+∞A
n(1, 0) = lim
n→+∞(1/2 + 2n+ 1) = +∞
where 1 denotes the constant sequence whose terms are all equal to +1.
In particular, if -A is the order defined by A on RN, and A is the strict
order associated10 to -A, it is obtained that:
−1 A 0 A 1.
Thus, if a recursive function U induces the same order, one should have
U(−1) < U(0) < U(1).
But since U is recursive,
A(0, U(0)) = U(0).
First assume U(0) finite. Then if U(0) ≥ 1, the last equality can be written
U(0) + 1 = U(0),
a contradiction. Otherwise, if U(0) < 1, one gets
U(0)/2 + 1/2 = U(0)
thus U(0) = 1, a contradiction. Hence, finally, U(0) = +∞ or U(0) = −∞,
which contradicts U(−1) < U(0) < U(+1). QED
10that is, x A y if x -A y is true and y -A x is false.
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3.4 Aggregator-based vs Recursive Payoff-based Maxim-
ization Programs
3.4.1 Definitions of maximization programs
In order to embrace standard configurations and occurrences, e.g., Econom-
ics, Finance, . . . , some extra structure is now going to be added to the set
of constraints. Assume that some initial state x0 ∈ X is defined, X being
the set of the states. The law of evolution of such states is defined through
a multivalued mapping Γ, defined from X to X, with nonempty values,
meaning that states xt+1 at time t+ 1 should satisfy xt+1 ∈ Γ
(
xt
)
, where xt
denotes the state at time t. Given two states xt and xt+1, the set of feasible
actions at time t is denoted as Ω
(
xt, xt+1
)
, Ω being a multivalued mapping
defined from Gr(Γ)—the graph of Γ—to Z with nonempty values. The set
of feasible sequences of actions for a given x0, Σ
(
x0), can thus be written as
follows:
Σ
(
x0
)
=
{(
zt
)
t∈N ∈ ZN : ∃
(
xt
)
t∈N∗ ∈ XN : ∀t ∈ N, xt+1 ∈ Γ
(
xt
)
,
zt ∈ Ω
(
xt, xt+1
)}
.
It will also at times be of some convenience to consider the associated set of
sequences of actions and states, i.e.,
Σ˜
(
x0
)
=
{((
zt
)
t∈N,
(
xt
)
t∈N∗
)
∈ ZN ×XN : ∀t ∈ N, xt+1 ∈ Γ
(
xt
)
,
zt ∈ Ω
(
xt, xt+1
)}
.
In the following, a primitive model will refer to a triple (A,Γ,Ω), for A an
aggregator, and Γ and Ω the feasibility correspondences. Given a model
(A,Γ,Ω), and a recursive payoff function U : ZN → R associated to A,
recalling the aggregator-based payoffs of Definition 3.1, distinct optimization
problems can be considered:
sup
˜
z∈Σ(x0)
w
(
˜
z
)
,(P )
sup
˜
z∈Σ(x0)
w
(
˜
z
)
,(P )
sup
˜
z∈Σ(x0)
U(
˜
z).(P )
Let v∗ : X → [−∞,+∞] be the value function of P , defined by
∀x0 ∈ X, v∗(x0) = sup
˜
z∈Σ(x0)
w
(
˜
z
)
,
and let v∗ : X → [−∞,+∞] be the value function of P , defined by
∀x0 ∈ X, v∗(x0) = sup
˜
z∈Σ(x0)
w
(
˜
z
)
.
The current contribution advocates a focus on (P) or (P) instead of (P).
A first reason comes from the ensued simplicity: Problem (P ) is a plain
maximization over an infinite horizon intertemporal payoff whilst Problems
(P ) and (P ) are maximization problems of the mere limits of finite horizon
intertemporal payoffs. Second, it could be somewhat demanding to assume,
9
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as this is pre-supposed by Problem (P ), that consumers were able to max-
imize over a set of infinite action sequences. Along the same range of ideas,
a preference relationship over Z × R is simpler and more testable than a
preference relationship on ZN. Lastly, having assumed that preferences are
firstly and plainly represented by the aggregator, whilst a recursive payoff
function brings about some analytical convenience, as this was illustrated
through the subsequent proposition, working with a recursive payoff function
may reveal inappropriate in some given configurations.
3.4.2 Values of the Programs may differ
As this is soon going to be clarified, the comparison between these programs
will be facilitated by the retainment of the following assumption that will
also at times be referred to in the subsequent exposition:
Null Assumption.— [Null Consumption] There exists (a, a, . . . , a, . . .) ∈
∩x∈XΣ(x) with U(a, a, . . . , a, . . .) = 0.
Such an assumption is rather weak and appears, e.g., as Assumption B6,
p.17 in Streufert [20]. It could be perceived as a free disposal assumption
and is generally valid in economic setups. Further remark that if there
exists (a, a, . . . , a, . . .) ∈ ∩x∈XΣ(x) with α = U(a, a, ...) finite, then Null
Consumption can be assumed without any loss of generality. Consider in-
deed a new recursive function U˜ = U−α and a new aggregator A˜ defined by
A˜(z, v) = A(z, v + α)− α. Then U˜ is a recursive payoff function associated
to the aggregator A˜ and U˜(a, a, . . .) = 0. Besides, the preferences defined
by A or U are identical to those defined by A˜ or U˜ .
The following statement then establishes how the two first aggregator-based
optimization problems (P ) and (P ) can exhibit distinct solutions and differ-
ent values from the ones that result from the solving of the recursive function
payoff-based Optimization problem (P ). As stated in Proposition 3.1, this
also proves that the orders that derive from the aggregator may differ from
the one induced by a recursive payoff function.
Proposition 3.2.— Consider the optimization programs (P ), (P ) and (P ):
(i) The optimization problems (P ) and (P ) (and similarly (P ) and (P ))
may have different solutions.
(ii) Further letting the Null Assumption prevail, Val(P ) ≥ Val(P ), an in-
equality that can be strict.
Proof. (i) Consider the optimization problem where Z = R, A(z, v) =
v/2 + 1/2 − (z)2 if v < 1, A(z, v) = v + 1 − (z)2 otherwise. Moreover,
A(z,+∞) = +∞ and A(z,−∞) = −∞. Lastly, assume that there is no
feasibility constraints. Then
An
(
˜
z, 0
)
=
n∑
k=1
1
2k
−
n−1∑
k=0
z2k
1
2k
.
More specifically, the value of (P ) is 1, and this maximum is reached only at
0, the null sequence, i.e., the set of solutions to this optimization problem
summarizes to Sol(P ) = {0}.
10
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In contradistinction with this, the aim is to prove that the set of solutions
of the associated recursive payoff-based optimization problem is such that
(3.2) Sol(P ) 6= {0}.
Indeed, either the set of solutions of (P ) is empty, and Equation 3.2 is
satisfied in a trivial way. Or the maximum of U is reached at some
˜
z ∈ Σ(x0).
Let then prove that U(
˜
z) is to be infinite.
Ad absurdum, assume instead that U(
˜
z) is finite. Then either U(
˜
z) < 1 and
for every a ∈ Z and for small enough values of a, U(a,
˜
z) = A(a, U(
˜
z)) =
U(
˜
z
)
/2 + 1/2− a2 > U(
˜
z) a contradiction. Or for every a ∈ Z and for small
enough values of a, U(
˜
z) ≥ 1, hence U(a,
˜
z) = A(a, U(
˜
z)) = U(
˜
z) + 1−a2 >
U(
˜
z), another contradiction. As a conclusion, U(
˜
z) is to be infinite.
Now if U(
˜
z) = −∞ then U is to be constantly equal to −∞, and the the
set of solutions of (P ) is ZN, whence the satisfaction of Equation 3.2. If
U(
˜
z) = +∞, then for every a ∈ Z, +∞ = A(a,+∞) = A(a, U(
˜
z)) = U(a,
˜
z),
and by iteration, U(
˜
y) = +∞ for every sequence
˜
y equal to
˜
z except for a
finite number of terms. In particular, the set of solutions of (P ) is infinite,
hence the satisfaction of Equation 3.2.
(ii) Additionally assuming Null Assumption, it derives that:
sup
˜
z∈Σ(x0)
limT→+∞AT
(
˜
z, 0
)
= sup
˜
z∈Σ(x0)
limT→+∞AT
(
˜
z, U(a, a, . . .
)
= sup
˜
z∈Σ(x0)
limT→+∞ U
(
z0, z1, . . . , zT−1, a, a, . . .
)
≤ sup
˜
z∈Σ(x0)
U
(
˜
z
)
,
since
(
z0, z1, . . . , zT−1, a, a, . . .
) ∈ Σ(x0). To prove that such an inequality
can be strict, consider an aggregator A such that A(z,+∞) = +∞. Remark
that for every recursive payoff U , one can construct a new recursive payoff
U as follows: fix
˜
z′ ∈ ZN, and define U(
˜
z
)
= +∞ if
˜
z =
˜
z′ but for a finite
number of terms, and U
(
˜
z
)
= U
(
˜
z
)
otherwise. Then U is a recursive payoff
associated to A, and the value of (P ) associated to this payoff is +∞, thus
is strictly larger than the value of (P ) and completes the argument of the
proof. QED
3.4.3 A Condition for the Values of the Programs to coincide
In the following, the function w is the objective function of the problem. It
can be equal to w or w.
Define
Σ0
(
x0
)
=
{
˜
z ∈ Σ(x0) : w(
˜
z
)
> −∞
}
,
as the set of action sequences feasible from an initial state x0 and which
generate a payoff which keeps on being bounded from below. Similarly, the
associated set of sequences of actions and states is available as:
Σ˜0
(
x0
)
=
{((
zt
)
t∈N,
(
xt
)
t∈N∗
) ∈ Σ˜(x0) : w(
˜
z
)
> −∞
}
.
11
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Definition 3.3. A pair of functions
(
f1, f2
) ∈ V 2, where V = F (X, [−∞,
+∞]), is said to satisfy Transversality if11
T1 ∀x0 ∈ X,∀
(
˜
z,
˜
x
) ∈ Σ˜0(x0), limT→+∞(AT (
˜
z, f1
(
xT
))−AT (
˜
z, 0
)) ≥ 0.
T2 ∀x0 ∈ X,∀
(
˜
z,
˜
x
) ∈ Σ˜(x0), limT→+∞(AT (
˜
z, f2
(
xT
))−AT (
˜
z, 0
)) ≤ 0.
Property T1 says that the payoff from t = 0 to time T is greater, asymp-
totically, if f1 is used instead of 0 to evaluate payoff at time T . Similarly,
Property T2 says that the payoff from t = 0 to time T is greater, asymp-
totically, if 0 is used instead of f2 to evaluate payoff at time T . Roughly,
transversality property of a function f compares asymptotically two inter-
temporal payoffs, the first one with a final payoff at date T defined by f ,
the second one with a final payoff at date T equal to 0.
A first important implication of this Transversality concept is to make pre-
cise the relationship between optimization problems (P ), (P ) and (P ):
Proposition 3.3.— Under the Increasing Monotonicity Assumption (IM),
further let a pair (v, v) satisfy the Transversality Assumption and U be a
recursive payoff function associated to A. If, for every x0 ∈ X and every
˜
z ∈ Σ(x0), U(
˜
z) ∈ [v(x0), v(x0)], then v∗(x0) = v∗(x0) = sup
˜
z∈Σ(x0) U(˜
z).
4. Dynamic Programming and Bellman
equation
This section will embed the main results of this contribution on the existence,
the uniqueness and the computation of the Bellman equation. The stand-
ard questions related to the associated Bellman operator and the dynamic
programming principle are the following: first, does the value functions cor-
respond to a solution to the Bellman equation? Second, is this the only
solution to the Bellman equation? Third and finally, can such a solution be
computed through an iteration scheme? A first part of this section will be
devoted to the description of the general dynamic programming framework,
a second one to the comparison between the aggregator approach and the
recursive payoff function within such framework that ought to justify the
current choice as the aggregating function as a primitive, the fourth part
encompasses a class of aggregators defined from the biconvergent recurs-
ive payoff functions of Streufert [20], [21], and analyzed under a new weak
continuity assumption, the fifth part considers some examples.
4.1 Existence of a solution to the Bellman Equation un-
der a Uniform Continuity Property
Let V = F (X, [−∞,+∞]) denote the set of functions from X to [−∞,+∞].
An element v of V associates to every initial condition x ∈ X a given level
for the payoff, possibly infinite.
Definition 4.1. The Bellman operator B : V → F (X, [−∞,+∞]) is
defined, for every v ∈ V and every x ∈ X, by
B(v)(x) = sup
y∈Γ(x)
{
sup
z∈Ω(x,y)
A(z, v(y))
}
.
11Remark that AT
(
˜
z, 0
)
and AT
(
˜
z, fi
(
xT
))
, i ∈ {1, 2}, could be simultaneously equal to
∞, which could lead to an indeterminacy: to avoid such problem, Convention I is retained
in this transversality condition.
12
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Example 4.1. Consider the aggregator defined in Proposition 3.2, with
Z = R, A(z, v) = v/2 + 1/2− z2 if v < 1 and A(z, v) = v+ 1− z2 otherwise.
But |A(z, 1 − η) − A(z, 1)| ≥ 1/2, hence A is not uniformly continuous in
v. For every feasible correspondences Γ and Ω such that Σ
(
x0
)
contains
the null sequence for every x0 ∈ X, the value function associated to A is
obtained for 0 and equal to 1. Yet, B(1)
(
x0
)
= 2, thus the value function
is not a fixed-point of the Bellman operator. Theorem 4.1 below will prove
that the value function is not being a fixed-point of B springs from the lack
of uniform continuity of A in v.
The following statement clarifies how, resting upon an extra boundary as-
sumption, Uniform Continuity and Increasing Monotonicity of the aggreg-
ator imply that the value function is a fixed point of the Bellman operator.
Theorem 4.1.— If the aggregator is uniformly continuous in v and satisfies
the Increasing Monotonicity and Boundary assumptions, then Bv∗ = v∗ and
Bv∗ = v∗.
The assumptions of this theorem are admittedly fairly weak, and cover a
large part of the aggregators found in the literature (see Examples 2.2 and
2.1). The next subsection covers two other important issues, uniqueness and
computation of a solution (see Theorem 4.2). It requires the introduction
of Transversality conditions.
4.2 Existence, Uniqueness and Computation of the Solu-
tions to the Bellman Equation
The aim of this section is to refine Theorem 4.1 in three directions:
(i) To get some uniqueness results.
(ii) To get some computation method of the solution by iteration. Oth-
erwise stated, can such a solution be computed through an iteration
scheme vn+1 = B(vn), i.e., is it true that the value functions can be
written as limits of the sequence (vn), for some adequate v0?
(iii) To encompass the aggregators defined from the biconvergent recursive
payoff functions introduced by Streufert [20], [21].
This will be argued to be anchored on two distinct ingredients, i.e., the
satisfaction of the Transversality properties T1 and T2 plus Weak Continuity
of the aggregator with respect to the future payoff, i.e., a refinement of the
Uniform Continuity assumption.
4.2.1 A Weak Continuity Assumption
Definition 4.2. Consider a function v from X to R. Define the function
f : [0, 1]N → R by
f(ε) = sup
(
˜
z,
˜
x)∈Σ˜(x0)
inf
n∈N
A
(
z0, A
(
z1, A
(
z2, . . .
. . . , A(zn−1, v
(
xn
))
+ εn−1
)
+ εn−2 + · · · ) + ε2) + ε1
)
,
13
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where ε = (εi)i∈N∗ . The aggregator A is said to be weakly continuous at v
if the function f is upper semicontinuous at 0.12
The price to pay for the generality of this assumption is its complexity: it is
admittedly less testable than Uniform continuity. The following statement
nonetheless establishes how Uniform continuity in v implies weak continuity
at v : X → R, whatever v:
Proposition 4.1.— If an aggregator A is uniformly continuous in v, then
it is weakly continuous at v for every v : X → R.
Yet, this weak continuity assumption shall allow for gathering two important
class of results in the dynamic programming literature that had hitherto
generally been considered as distinct. For the first class of results where
some transversality condition is involved, vid. Kamihigashi [7] or Levan-
Vailakis [10]. For the second one that involves instead some upper and lower
convergence criteria on the intertemporal payoff function, vid. Streufert [20],
[21].
It is worth emphasizing that weak continuity implies that f is continuous at
0, lower semicontinuity at 0 being a consequence of the Increasing Monoton-
icity Assumption. The interpretation of the weak continuity assumption is
then the following: assume that your terminal payoff at t = n is valued with
v and imagine a prudent entity that tries to maximize the worst possible
payoff —that the inf alludes to in the criterion—from 0 to n, n spanning
N, that results in f(0). The satisfaction of Weak Continuity then requires
that this optimal prudent payoff should not dramatically change if small
perturbations εi > 0 were added by each period i. In short, it says that the
optimal value of a prudent entity should vary continuously at 0 with respect
to small additive perturbations of payoffs through time.
4.2.2 Existence & Uniqueness of the solution to the Bellman
Equation
The following theorem is the main result of this section and equips the
analysis with some weak conditions under which the value function v∗ is the
only fixed point of the Bellman equation on some well behaved classes of
functions. It further provides an algorithm to compute the value function.
Theorem 4.2.— Assume Increasing Monotonicity Assumption. For every
(v, v) ∈ V 2 satisfying Transversality, with v(x0) ≤ v(x0) < +∞ for every
x0 ∈ X, and such that A is weakly continuous13 at v. Let v ∈ [v, v] such
that B(v) = v. Then
1. v = v∗ = v∗.
2. For every f ≤ v satisfying Transversality Assumption (T1), one has
limn→+∞Bnf = v.
3. If v and v also satisfy B(v) ≥ v and B(v) ≤ v, then there exists a
(unique) fixed-point of B in [v, v].
12For some well-suited topology on [0, 1]N such that every neighborhood of 0 intersect
]0, 1]N. This technical requirement would then provide a meaning to limε→0,ε6=0 f(ε), i.e.,
a limit whose existence is required from the proof of the main current Theorem 4.2, R
being currently endowed with the standard metric.
13This is true, in particular, when A is uniformly continuous in v
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To sum up, Theorem 4.2 and Theorem 4.1 both give conditions to get the
existence of a solution to the Bellman equation. These conditions are how-
ever not comparable in the general case, for on the one hand weak continuity
is weaker than uniform continuity in v, but on the other hand Theorem 4.2
requires to be able to get an interval [v, v] such that B([v, v]) ⊂ [v, v].
A conceivable difficulty with Theorem 4.2 stems from the actual possibility
of identifying a pair of functions v and v which fullfils the assumptions of
this theorem. The following class of examples is useful as it introduces a
general method that allows for finding these two candidate values. Broadly
speaking, it is based upon the idea of a the value function of aggregators
that dominates the primitive aggregator A.
Definition 4.3 (Aggregators dominated by well behaved aggregators). A
model (A,Γ,Ω) is said to be dominated by another model (A′,Γ′,Ω′) (writ-
ten (A,Γ,Ω) . (A′,Γ′,Ω′)) if A ≤ A′, Γ ⊂ Γ′ and Ω ⊂ Ω′.
From Theorem 4.1:
Proposition 4.2.— For every aggregator A, call v∗A the upper value asso-
ciated to A. Assume (A,Γ,Ω) . (A,Γ,Ω) . (A,Γ,Ω). If A, A and A are
uniformly continuous with respect to v, satisfy Increasing Monotonicity and
Boundary assumption, and if (v∗A, v∗A
) ∈ V 2 satisfies Transversality then
v∗A is the (unique) fixed-point in [v
∗
A, v
∗
A] of the Bellman operator associated
to A.
Proof. Let BA, BA and BA be the Bellman operators associated to the
aggregators A, A and A. From the domination assumptions, it is obtained
that BA(v∗A) ≥ BA(v∗A) = v∗A (the last equality being a consequence of
Theorem 4.1), and similarly, BA(v∗A) ≤ v∗A, and last, v∗A ≥ v∗A is obvious
from domination assumptions. Thus, from point (iii) of Theorem 4.2, v∗A is
the only fixed-point of BA in [v∗A, v∗A]. QED
4.2.3 Additive aggregators and Biconvergent aggregators
As an Illustration, consider now the Additive Aggregator case:
Example 4.2. (Additive Aggregator: Kamihigashi [5]). Theorem 4.2 al-
lows for recovering the results of Kamihigashi [5] that relate to the Bell-
man equation. Consider indeed the case where A(z, v) = u(z) + βv with
u : [−∞,+∞[→ R, β ∈]0, 1[, Z = X ×X and Ω(x, y) = {(x, y), y ∈ Γ(x)}.
Let L be either the infimum or the supremum limit operator. Consider the
two following sets
Π
(
x0
)
=
{(
xt
)
t∈N∗ ∈ XN : ∀t ∈ N, xt+1 ∈ Γ
(
xt
)}
,
Π0L
(
x0
)
=
{(
xt
)
t∈N∗ ∈ Π
(
x0
)
: LT→∞
T∑
t=0
βtu
(
xt, xt+1
)
> −∞
}
,
Suppose that, as in T. Kamihigashi [5], Theorem 2.1., that there exist v, v ∈
V such that v ≤ v, with B(v) ≥ v, B(v) ≤ v and
(4.1) ∀(xt)t∈N ∈ Π0L(x0), limt→+∞ βtv ≥ 0,
(4.2) ∀(xt)t∈N ∈ Π(x0), limt→+∞ βtv ≤ 0.
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The Increasing Monotonicity Assumption is naturally satisfied with this
additive formulation, A being further uniformly continuous in v. Moreover,
the pair (v, v) satisfies the Transversality assumption. Indeed, one has
AT
(
z0, . . . , zT , v
(
xT+1
))−AT (z0, . . . , zT , 0) = βT v(xT+1),
a similar equality being available for v. This establishes the Transversality
Assumption, from Equation 4.1 and Equation 4.2. Thus, and from Theorem
4.2, v∗ is the unique fixed-point of B. Moreover, taking f = v in Theorem
4.2, the sequence Bnv is easily seen to be increasing and Theorem 4.2(i)
implies that Bnv converges to v∗ for the pointwise convergence. To sum up,
Theorem 2.1. in Kamihigashi [5] is recovered.
Theorem 4.2 will allow for recovering a range of classical results due to Pete
Streufert and that relate to the status of the Bellman equation under a
Biconvergence assumption on the intertemporal payoff function U(·). In or-
der to rest upon the same formalism as Streufert, let Z = X and Ω(x, y) =
{y}, this modeling device being retained in the course of this subsection. Un-
der such a specialisation, a model can be written (A,Γ) and the aggregator
A summarizes to a mapping from X ×R → R. Within such a framework,
the Bellman operator B : F (X, [−∞,+∞])→ F (X, [−∞,+∞]) is defined,
for every v ∈ F (X, [−∞,+∞]) and every x ∈ X, by:
B(v)(x) = sup
y∈Γ(x)
A(y, v(y)).
Let then U denote a recursive payoff function associated to A. The function
U is said to be upper convergent over
∏+∞
t=0 Γ
t(x0) if
∀
˜
x ∈
+∞∏
t=0
Γt
(
x0
)
, lim
t→+∞ supU
(
x0, . . . , xt,
+∞∏
s=t+1
Γs
(
x0
))
= U
(
˜
x
)
The function U is said to be lower convergent over
∏+∞
t=0 Γ
t
(
x0
)
if
∀
˜
x ∈
+∞∏
t=0
Γt
(
x0
)
, lim
t→+∞ inf U
(
x0, .., xt,
+∞∏
s=t+1
Γs
(
x0
))
= U(
˜
x)
The function U is biconvergent over
∏+∞
t=0 Γ
t
(
x0
)
if it is both upper and
lower convergent over
∏+∞
t=0 Γ
t
(
x0
)
.
An admittedly convenient reformulation of biconvergence states as follows:
Definition 4.4. Consider the model (A,Γ) and U : XN → [−∞,+∞], a
recursive function associated to A. Let x0 ∈ X. Then U is said to be
biconvergent over
∏+∞
t=0 Γ
t(x0) if for every ε > 0, there is N ∈ N such
that for every (x0, x1, . . .) ∈
∏+∞
t=0 Γ
t
(
x0
)
and every
(
x′N+1, x
′
N+2, . . .
) ∈∏+∞
t=N+1 Γ
t
(
x0
)
, one has:∣∣U(x1, x2, . . . , xN , xN+1, xN+2, . . .)− U(x1, x2, . . . , xN , x′N+1, x′N+2, . . .))∣∣ ≤ ε.
Otherwise stated, there exists some date N for which the recursive pay-
off function can be approximated by only considering the N first actions,
whatever the other actions that locate in the tail of the sequence and from
date N + 1 on.
The following result, obtained by Streufert [20], is a Corollary of Theorem
4.2:
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Corollary.— Assume X is a topological space, U is a recursive payoff
function associated to A, the Increasing Monotonicity and Null Assumptions
prevail, A is u.s.c., Γ is a u.s.c. multivalued function from X to X with
compact values, and maxU(
∏+∞
t=1 Γ
t(x0)) exists. Then v
∗ : X → R defined
by v∗(x0) = sup
˜
z∈Σ(x0) U(˜
z) is a solution to the Bellman equation, and the
unique solution whenever U is biconvergent over
∏+∞
t=0 Γ
t(x0).
A. Proof of Lemma 2.1
Proof. Let us show (i)⇔ (ii) where
(i) There exists δ : R → R that tends to 0 at 0 and such that, for every
(z, v, v′) ∈ Z ×R×R, |A(z, v)−A(z, v′)| ≤ δ(v − v′) and
(ii) A is uniformly continuous in v.
Clearly (i) ⇒ (ii). Let us show that (ii) ⇒ (i). Assume A is uniformly
continuous in v and define for every x ∈ R:
δ(x) = sup
(z,v)∈Z×R
{|A(z, v + x)−A(z, v)|}.
By definition of δ, Condition (i) is true, and continuity of δ at 0 comes from
Condition (ii). QED
B. Proof of Theorem 2.1
Proof. This is a direct corollary of Levin 1991 [11]’s Theorem 1. Indeed, for
a chain τ , the sum
∑
i∈I≺ [d(zi, zi−1) + |vi − vi−1| is exactly the so-denoted
S(d,||),(τ) by Levin and the condition that for any (z, v), (z′, v′) ∈ Z×R such
that (z′, v′) ≺ (z, v), there exists α > 0 such that for any chain ((zi, vi))ni=0 ∈
C((z, v), (z′, v′)),∑
i∈I≺
[d(zi, zi−1) + |vi − vi−1|] ≥ α
is equivalent to condition (2) of Levin [11]’s Theorem 1, i.e., if e′ ≺ e,
inf
τ∈C(e,e′)
S(d,||),(τ) > 0.
So the theorem applies and concludes through the assertion (1) of Levin
[11]’s Theorem 1 that  can be represented by an aggregator A that satisfies
∀(z, v), (z′, v′) ∈ Z ×R, |A(z, v)−A(z′, v′)| ≤ d(z, z′) + |v − v′|
which implies that ∃δ : R → R+ continuous at 0, such that δ(0) = 0 and
∀z ∈ Z, ∀v, v′ ∈ R, |A(z, v) − A(z, v′)| ≤ δ(v − v′), i.e., A is uniformly
continuous in v.
Moreover, if  is increasing in v, then A satisfies (IM) Increasing Monoton-
icity. QED
C. Proof of Proposition 3.3.
Proof. Define v∗∗(x0) = sup
˜
z∈Σ(x0)
U(
˜
z). By definition,
∀
˜
z ∈ Σ(x0), v∗∗(x0) ≥ U(
˜
z).
17
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The functional U being recursively associated to A, this restates as:
∀n ∈ N∗, ∀(z0, . . . , zn, . . .) ∈ Σ(x0), v∗∗(x0) ≥ An(
˜
z, U(zn+1, zn+2, . . .)).
Thus, From Increasing Monotonicity Assumption and since v ”bounds” U
from below, for every (
˜
z,
˜
x) ∈ Σ˜(x0):
v∗∗(x0) ≥ An(
˜
z, v(xn+1)).
Writing
An(
˜
z, v(xn+1)) = (A
n(
˜
z, v(xn+1)−An(
˜
z, 0)) +An(
˜
z, 0).
Taking the supremum limit and then the supremum:
v∗∗(x0) ≥ v∗(x0) ≥ v∗(x0)
To complete the proof, i.e., to establish that v∗∗(x0) ≤ v∗(x0), assume now
that v∗∗(x0) > −∞ (otherwise v∗∗(x0) ≤ v∗x0) is clear). Then, from the
definition of the supremum, for every ε > 0, there is
˜
z ∈ Σ(x0) such that
v∗∗(x0) ≤ U(
˜
z) + ε.
The functional U being recursive:
∀n ∈ N∗, v∗∗(x0) ≤ An(
˜
z, U(zn+1, zn+2, . . .)) + ε.
Thus, From Increasing Monotonicity Assumption, and since v ”bounds” U
from above, for every
˜
x ∈ XN such that (
˜
z,
˜
x) ∈ Σ˜(x0):
∀n ∈ N∗, v∗∗(x0) ≤ An(
˜
z, v(xn+1)) + ε.
Exactly as in the end of Step 2 of the proof of Theorem 4.2, reformulating
An(
˜
z, v(xn+1)) = (A
n(
˜
z, v(xn+1))−An(
˜
z, 0)) +An(
˜
z, 0),
taking the infimum limit, then the supremum and taking the limit when ε
tends to zero:
v∗∗(x0) ≤ v∗(x0) ≤ v∗(x0),
and finally,
v∗∗(x0) = v∗(x0) = v∗(x0),
that completes the argument of the proof. QED
D. Proof of Theorem 4.1.
The proof is given for the case where the objective function, denote w,
is equal to w, and the upper value v∗ shall be simply denoted v∗. The
modifications of the proof required for the infimum limit case (w = w)
being made explicit when necessitated.
Two preparatory lemmas will first be needed for the establishment of the
argument of the proof of of Theorem 4.1:
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Lemma D.1.— Letting x0 ∈ X and x1 ∈ Γ(x0), any z0 ∈ Ω(x0, x1) and any
˜
z′ = (zn)n∈N∗ ∈ Σ0(x1), v∗(x1) = −∞ implies limT→+∞A(z0, AT (
˜
z′, 0)) =
−∞ (or limT→+∞A(z0, AT (
˜
z′, 0)) = −∞ when w(
˜
z) = limT→+∞AT (
˜
z, 0)).
Proof. If v∗(x1) = −∞ then limT→+∞AT (
˜
z′, 0) = −∞ for every
˜
z′ ∈ Σ(x1)
(or limT→+∞AT (
˜
z′, 0) = −∞ in the infimum limit case). Boundary assump-
tion implies limT→+∞A(z0, AT (
˜
z′, 0)) = −∞ for every z0 ∈ Ω(x0, x1) (or
limT→+∞A(z0, AT (
˜
z′, 0)) = −∞ in the infimum limit case). QED
Lemma D.2.— Letting x0 ∈ X, for every x1 ∈ Γ(x0), v∗(x1) = +∞ implies
v∗(x0) = +∞.
Proof. By definition, x0 and x1 ∈ Γ(x0) being fixed,
v∗(x0) = sup
˜
z∈Σ(x0)
limT→+∞AT (
˜
z, 0)
≥ sup
z0∈Ω(x0,x1),(zn)n∈N∗∈Σ(x1)
limT→+∞A(z0, AT−1((zn)n∈N∗ , 0))
≥ A
(
z0, sup
(zn)n∈N∗∈Σ(x1)
limT→+∞AT−1((zn)n∈N∗ , 0)
)
for every z0 ∈ Ω(x0, x1), the last inequality being a consequence of uniform
continuity of A in v and Increasing Monotonicity Assumption. But v∗(x1) =
+∞, thus
sup
(zn)n∈N∗∈Σ(x1)
limT→+∞AT−1((zn)n∈N∗ , 0)) = +∞,
and finally Boundary Assumption and the inequality above implies v∗(x0) =
+∞. The proof is identical in the infimum limit case (replacing supremum
limit by infimum limit). QED
First show Bv∗ ≥ v∗. Let x0 ∈ X. If v∗(x0) = −∞ then Bv∗(x0) ≥ v∗(x0)
is true. Now, assuming v∗(x0) > −∞.
Let x1 ∈ X such that v∗(x1) > −∞. By definition,
v∗(x1) = sup
˜
z∈Σ(x1)
w(
˜
z)
= sup
˜
z∈Σ0(x1)
w(
˜
z)
where Σ0(x1) = {
˜
z ∈ Σ(x1) : w(
˜
z) > −∞} is nonempty since v∗(x1) > −∞.
Let z˜ ∈ Σ0(x1). From the definition of the supremum:
(D.1) v∗(x1) ≥ w(
˜
z),
Now, since w(
˜
z) = limT→+∞AT (
˜
z, 0), and since z˜ ∈ Σ0(x1), given η > 0,
there exists T x1,˜
z,η such that for every T ′ ≥ T x1,˜z,η (or for an infinite number
of T when w(
˜
z) = limT→+∞AT (
˜
z, 0)):
(D.2) w(
˜
z) ≥ AT ′(
˜
z, 0)− η,
where the two sides ot this inequality can be equal to +∞.
Hence, from Equation D.1 and Equation D.2, for every x1 ∈ Γ(x0) with
v∗(x1) > −∞, every
˜
z ∈ Σ0(x1), every η > 0 and every T ′ ≥ T x1,˜z,η (or for
an infinite number of T when w(
˜
z) = limT→+∞AT (
˜
z, 0)), it is derived that:
(D.3) v∗(x1) ≥ AT ′(
˜
z, 0)− η.
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Fix ε > 0. From the definition of the uniform continuity of A in v (see
Definition 2.1), there exists η > 0 such that:
(D.4) ∀(z0, v, v′) ∈ Z ×R×R, |v − v′| ≤ η ⇒ |A(z0, v)−A(z0, v′)| ≤ ε.
By definition,
Bv∗(x0) = sup
x1∈Γ(x0)
{
sup
z0∈Ω(x0,x1)
A(z0, v
∗(x1))
}
,
also equal to
Bv∗(x0) = sup
x1∈Γ(x0):v∗(x1)>−∞
{
sup
z0∈Ω(x0,x1)
A(z0, v
∗(x1))
}
,
because A(z0,−∞) = −∞ from Boundary Assumption, and since there
exists x1 ∈ Γ(x0) such that v∗(x1) > −∞ (otherwise, from Lemma D.1,
v∗(x0) = −∞, a contradiction). This last equality, Equation D.2 and In-
creasing Monotonicity Assumption imply:
(D.5)
Bv∗(x0) ≥ A(z0, AT (
˜
z′, 0)− η),∀x1 ∈ Γ(x0) : v∗(x1) > −∞,
∀z0 ∈ Ω(x0, x1),∀
˜
z′ = (zn)n∈N∗ ∈ Σ0(x1),∀T ≥ T x1,˜z
′,η
0 .
(this inequality being only true for an infinite number of T in the infimum
limit case.) Now, Equation D.5 implies, with Equation D.4:
(D.6)
Bv∗(x0) ≥ A(z0, AT (
˜
z′, 0))− ε, ∀x1 ∈ Γ(x0) : v∗(x1) > −∞,
∀z0 ∈ Ω(x0, x1),∀
˜
z′ = (zn)n∈N∗ ∈ Σ0(x1),∀T ≥ T x1,˜z
′,η
0 .
(this inequality being only true for an infinite number of T in the in-
fimum limit case.) If (zn)n∈N∗ /∈ Σ0(x1) but (zn)n∈N∗ ∈ Σ(x1) , then
limT→+∞AT ((zn)n∈N∗ , 0)) = −∞ (or limT→+∞AT ((zn)n∈N∗ , 0)) = −∞ in
the infimum limit case) which implies limT→+∞A(z0, AT ((zn)n∈N∗ , 0)) =
−∞ (or, in the infimum limit case, limT→+∞A(z0, AT ((zn)n∈N∗ , 0)) = −∞)
from Boundary Assumption. The same conclusion is true if v∗(x1) = −∞
and (zn)n∈N∗ ∈ Σ0(x1)(from Lemma D.1). Thus, passing to the supremum
limit (infimum limit when w(
˜
z) = limT→+∞AT (
˜
z, 0)) in Equation D.6, the
conditions (zn)n∈N∗ ∈ Σ0(x1) and v∗(x1) > −∞ can be removed and one
simply gets:
Bv∗(x0) ≥ limT→+∞A(z0, AT (S(
˜
z), 0))− ε, ∀
˜
z ∈ Σ(x0),
The supremum limit being an infimum limit whenever w(
˜
z) = limT→+∞AT (
˜
z, 0).
Passing to the supremum:
Bv∗(x0) ≥ v∗(x0)− ε.
Passing to the limit when ε > 0 tends to 0, one finally obtains
Bv∗(x0) ≥ v∗(x0),
which establishes Bv∗ ≥ v∗.
To prove B(v∗)(x0) ≤ v∗(x0) for every x0 ∈ X, first assume B(v∗)(x0) <
+∞.
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From the definition of the supremum and since B(v∗)(x0) < +∞, for every
ε > 0 (now fixed), there exists x1 ∈ Γ(x0) (now fixed) with z0 ∈ Ω(x0, x1)
such that
(D.7) Bv∗(x0) ≤ A(z0, v∗(x1)) + ε/2
If v∗(x1) = +∞, then from Lemma D.2, v∗(x0) = +∞, thus B(v∗)(x0) ≤
v∗(x0) is true. Assume now that v∗(x1) < +∞. Then, from the definition
of v∗(x1), for every η > 0, there exists (zn)n∈N∗ ∈ Σ(x1) such that
v∗(x1) ≤ limT→+∞AT ((zn)n∈N∗ , 0) + η/2,
where the supremum limit is an infimum limit in the second case.
The supremum limit being the (greatest) cluster point, for every η > 0, it is
obtained that:
(D.8) v∗(x1) ≤ AT ((zn)n∈N∗ , 0) + η.
for an infinite number of T ∈ N (or for T large enough in the infimum limit
case).
From the definition of uniform continuity of A (see Definition 2.1), there
exists η > 0 (now fixed) such that:
(D.9) ∀(z0, v, v′) ∈ Z ×R×R, |v − v′| ≤ η ⇒ |A(z0, v)−A(z0, v′)| ≤ ε/2.
Hence, from Increasing Monotonicity Assumption, from Equations D.7 and
D.8, the following condition holds for an infinite number of T ∈ N (or for T
large enough in the infimum limit case):
Bv∗(x0) ≤ A(z0, AT ((zn)n∈N∗ , 0) + η) + ε/2
≤ A(z0, AT ((zn)n∈N∗ , 0)) + ε, from Equation D.9
≤ v∗(x0) + ε.
passing to the supremum limit (or the infimum limit in the infimum limit
case). This prevails for any ε > 0, whence B(v∗)(x0) ≤ v∗(x0).
Last, to prove B(v∗)(x0) ≤ v∗(x0) when B(v∗)(x0) = +∞, simply replace,
in all the proof from Equation D.7 up to the end, B(v∗)(x0) by any constant
L > 0. The same line of the argument for the proof then yields L ≤ v∗(x0)
for every L > 0, thus v∗(x0) = +∞ = B(v∗)(x0).
E. Proof of Proposition 4.1
Proof. Let δ such that for every (z, v, v′) ∈ Z × R2, ∣∣A(z, v) − A(z, v′)∣∣ ≤
δ(v−v′), where δ : R→ R tends to 0 at 0. For every (
˜
z,
˜
x) ∈ Σ˜(x0), iterating
the definition of Uniform continuity in v and Monotonicity for every period,
one obtains:
A(z0, A(z1, A(z2, . . . , A(zn−1, v(xn)) + εn−1) + εn−2 + · · · ) + ε2) + ε1)(E.1)
≤ A(z0, A(z1, A(z2, . . . , A(zn−1, v(xn))) + · · · ))
· · · + δ(ε1 + δ(ε2 + · · ·+ δ(εn−2 + δ(εn−1)) · · · ).
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For every a > 0, define
Va =
{
(εn)n∈N∗ ∈ [0, 1]N : ∀(ε′n)n∈N∗ ∈ [0, 2εi]N,
δ(ε′1) ≤ a, δ(ε′2) ≤ ε1, . . . , δ(ε′n−1) ≤ εn−2, . . .
}
.
This set is nonempty (it contains 0). Moreover, every Va intersects ]0, 1]
N
(indeed, since δ is continuous at 0, one can define some εi > 0 inductively
with (ε)i ∈ Va). Consider on [0, 1]N the topology generated by this family
of neighbourhood of 0. It has been shown that every neighborhood of 0
intersects ]0, 1]N. Moreover, for every (εn)n∈N∗ ∈ Va and every integer
n ≥ 1, εn−2 + δ(εn−1) ≤ εn−2 + εn−2, thus δ(εn−2 + δ(εn−1)) ≤ εn−3.
Iterating, one derives that:
δ(ε1 + δ(ε2 + · · ·+ δ(εn−2 + δ(εn−1)) · · · ) ≤ a
for every integer n, thus from equation (E.1) and the definition of f , passing
to infimum with respect n, then to supremum, one obtains:
∀ε ∈ Va, f(ε) ≤ f(0) + a,
which proves weak continuity of A, that concludes the proof. QED
F. Proof of Theorem 4.2
Proof. Consider [v, v] such that (v, v) ∈ V 2 satisfies Transversality and v a
fixed point of B on [v, v], with v(x0) < +∞ for every x0 ∈ X.
Step 1. First prove that v ≥ v∗.
First, let x0 ∈ X.
If v∗(x0) = −∞, v(x0) ≥ v∗(x0) is true. Let x0 such that v∗(x0) >
−∞. Then v∗(x0) = sup
˜
z∈Σ(x0)w(˜
z) = sup
˜
z∈Σ0(x0)w(˜
z), where Σ0(x0) =
{
˜
z ∈ Σ(x0) : w(
˜
z) > −∞}.
By definition of B and since v is a fixed point of B, it is obtained that
(F.1) ∀x1 ∈ Γ(x0),∀z0 ∈ Ω(x0, x1), v(x0) = B(v)(x0) ≥ A(z0, v(x1)).
Similarly,
(F.2) ∀x2 ∈ Γ(x1),∀z1 ∈ Ω(x1, x2), v(x1) = B(v)(x1) ≥ A(z1, v(x2)).
Consequently, from Increasing Monotonicity Assumption, reinjecting
Equation F.2 into Equation F.1, it derives that, for every x1 ∈ Γ(x0),
for every x2 ∈ Γ(x1), for every z0 ∈ Ω(x0, x1) and for every z1 ∈
Ω(x1, x2),
(F.3) B(v)(x0) ≥ A(z0, A(z1, v(x2))).
Iterating Equation F.3, it is similarly obtained that for every T ∈ N∗
for every (
˜
z,
˜
x) ∈ Σ˜(x0),
(F.4) B(v)(x0) ≥ AT (
˜
z, v(xT+1)).
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From v ≥ v and from Increasing Monotonicity Assumption, Equation
F.4 gives
(F.5) B(v)(x0) ≥ AT (
˜
z, v(xT+1))
If this last quantity is equal to +∞ for at least one integer T , then
v(x0) = B(v)(x0) = +∞ ≥ v∗(x0), and the proof of Step 1 is over.
If not, AT (
˜
z, v(xT+1)) < +∞ for every integer T . Since v satisfies
Transversality assumption (T1), this implies AT (
˜
z, 0) < +∞ for every
integer T .
To prove that B(v)(x0) ≥ v∗(x0) still holds, one will establish that
B(v)(x0) ≥ w(
˜
z). If w(
˜
z) = −∞, then B(v)(x0) ≥ w(
˜
z) is clear.
Otherwise, w(
˜
z) = −∞. Then AT (
˜
z, 0) > −∞ (thus AT (
˜
z, 0) is real)
for an infinite number of T . From the previous equation and for an
infinite number of T :
(F.6) B(v)(x0) ≥ (AT (
˜
z, v(xT+1))−AT (
˜
z, 0)) +AT (
˜
z, 0)
Taking the supremum limit in the above inequality, Transversality
Assumption (T) implies, for every
˜
z ∈ Σ0(x0)
B(v)(x0) ≥ limT→∞(AT (
˜
z, v(xT+1)−AT (
˜
z, 0)) + limT→∞AT (
˜
z, 0) = w(
˜
z)(F.7)
Thus, B(v)(x0) ≥ w(
˜
z) is always true.
Now, taking the sup when
˜
z varies in Σ0(x0), it is finally obtained
that:
(F.8) v(x0) = B(v)(x0) ≥ v∗(x0).
Step 2. The aim is now to prove that v ≤ v∗.
Fix x0 in X. For v(x0) = −∞, then v(x0) ≤ v∗(x0) is true. Thus, since
v(x0) ≤ v(x0) < +∞, the case v(x0) ∈ R is now to be considered.
For every integer n, let εn > 0. From the definition of B(v), there
exists x1 ∈ Γ(x0) and z0 ∈ Ω(x0, x1) (depending on ε1) such that
(F.9) v(x0) = B(v)(x0) ≤ A(z0, v(x1)) + ε1/2
where v(x1) ≤ v(x1) < +∞ by assumption. Thus, similarly, there
exists x2 ∈ Γ(x1) and z1 ∈ Ω(x1, x2) (depending on ε1 and ε2) such
that
(F.10) v(x1) ≤ A(z1, v(x2)) + ε2/2.
Reinjecting Equation F.10 into Equation F.9, and from the Increasing
Monotonicity Assumption, it derives that:
v(x0) ≤ A(z0, A(z1, v(x2)) + ε2/2) + ε1/2
By induction, for every integer n, one builds (xn)n≥0 in X and (zn)n≥0
in Z such that
(F.11) ∀i > 0, xi+1 ∈ Γ(xi), zi ∈ Ω(xi, xi+1),
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and such that for every integer n,
v(x0) ≤ A(z0, A(z1, A(z2, . . . , A(zn−1, v(xn)) + εn)
(F.12)
+ εn−1/2 + · · · ) + ε2/2) + ε1/2.
where use has been made of v ≤ v < +∞ and of the Increasing Mono-
tonicity Assumption for the last inequalities. Passing to the infimum
with respect to n and taking then the supremum with respect to
˜
z and
˜
x, it is obtained that:
v(x0) ≤ sup
(
˜
z,
˜
x)∈Σ˜(x0)
inf
n≥0
A(z0, A(z1, A(z2, . . . , A(zn−1, v(xn)) + εn)
(F.13)
+ εn−1/2 + · · · ) + ε2/2) + ε1/2.
Now, from Weak Continuity assumption, the function f : [0, 1]N → R
define by
f(ε) = sup
(
˜
z,
˜
x)∈Σ˜(x0)
inf
n≥0
A(z0, A(z1, . . . , A(zn−1, v(xn)) + εn)
+ εn−1/2 + · · · ) + ε2/2) + ε1/2
is upper semicontinuous, [0, 1]N being endowed with a good metric.
Thus, passing to the limit when ε tends to 0 in Equation F.13, it
derives that:
(F.14)
v(x0) ≤ sup
(
˜
z,
˜
x)∈Σ˜(x0)
inf
n≥0
A(z0, A(z1, A(z2, . . . , A(zn−1, v(xn)))+· · · )).
Fix ε > 0. From Equation F.14, there exists (
˜
z,
˜
x) ∈ Σ˜(x0) such that
for every integer n ≥ 1,
(F.15) v(x0) ≤ An(
˜
z, v(xn)) + ε.
Now, v(x0) > −∞ implies An(
˜
z, v(xn)) > −∞ for every n ≥ 1, and
from Transversality Assumption (T2), one obtains An(
˜
z, 0) > −∞ for
n large enough.
Also assuming that An(
˜
z, 0) < +∞ for an infinite number of n, other-
wise v∗(x0) = +∞ and the inequality v(x0) ≤ v∗(x0) is proved. Thus
An(
˜
z, 0) ∈ R for an infinite number of n. Equation F.15 can thus be
reformulated along:
(F.16) v(x0) ≤ (An(
˜
z, v(xn))−An(
˜
z, 0))) +An(
˜
z, 0) + ε.
for every n such that An(
˜
z, 0) is finite. This implies v(x0) ≤ v∗(x0),
taking the infimum limit with respect to n and from Transversality
Assumption (T2), then taking supremum with respect to
˜
z ∈ Σ(x0),
and finally taking the limit when ε→ 0.
Step 3. Let us prove the second Assertion in Theorem 4.2. Let f ∈ V
such that f ≤ v and f satisfies (T1). Prove that v = limn→+∞Bn(f).
Recall that v = v∗ = v∗.
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Since f ≤ v, composing this inequality n times by B, which is non-
decreasing, one derives that Bn(f) ≤ v ( v being a fixed point of B).
Taking the supremum limit and for every x0 ∈ X,
(F.17) limn→+∞Bn(f)(x0) ≤ v(x0)
Prove then that limn→+∞Bn(f)(x0) ≥ v(x0) for every x0 ∈ X. From
the definition of the Bellman Operator B and given some x0 ∈ X:
(F.18) ∀x1 ∈ Γ(x0),∀z0 ∈ Ω(x0, x1), B2(f)(x0) ≥ A(z0, B(f)(x1)).
Similarly, one obtains
(F.19) ∀x2 ∈ Γ(x1),∀z1 ∈ Ω(x1, x2), B(f)(x1) ≥ A(z1, f(x2)).
Consequently, from Increasing Monotonicity Assumption, reinjecting
Inequation F.19 into Inequation F.18, it is obtained that, for every
x1 ∈ Γ(x0), for every x2 ∈ Γ(x1), for every z0 ∈ Ω(x0, x1), for every
z1 ∈ Ω(x1, x2),
(F.20) B2(f)(x0) ≥ A(z0, A(z1, f(x2))).
From an immediate induction, it is similarly obtained that:
(F.21) ∀n ∈ N∗, ∀
˜
x ∈ Π(x0),∀
˜
z ∈ Σ(x0), Bn(f)(x0) ≥ An(
˜
z, f(xn)).
If An(
˜
z, f(xn)) = +∞ for a infinite number of n, then passing to the
supremum limit, it derives that limn→+∞Bn(f)(x0) = +∞ ≥ v(x0).
Hence assuming now that An(
˜
z, f(xn)) < +∞ for n large enough, and
since f satisfies Transversality assumption (T1), it is obtained that
An(
˜
z, 0) < +∞ for n large enough.
Now, if v(x0) = −∞, limn→+∞Bn(f) ≥ v(x0) = −∞ is true. Assum-
ing now that v(x0) > −∞. Since v(x0) = v∗(x0) > −∞, it derives
that An(
˜
z, 0) > −∞ for an infinite number of integer n.
Consequently, for every integer n such that An(
˜
z, 0) > −∞:
Bn(f)(x0) ≥ (An(
˜
z, f(xn))−An(
˜
z, 0))) +An(
˜
z, 0).
and, taking then the supremum limit and then the supremum for
˜
z ∈
Σ0(x0), this finally gives limn→+∞Bn(f)(x0) ≥ v∗(x0) = v(x0) from
(T1) assumption satisfied by f .
Step 4. To prove the last point of Theorem 4.2, assume that v and v above
also satisfy v ≤ B(v) and B(v) ≤ v, then, from Tarski fixed point theorem
on [v, v], B admits a fixed-point on [v, v], and from the first part of Theorem
4.2 (i), this fixed-point is equal to the value function.
QED
G. Proof of Corollary 4.2.3
Proof. First prove the following Lemma:
Lemma G.1.— Assume Assumption (Null) and biconvergence:
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(i) If A is upper semicontinuous, then v(x0) = inf
˜
y∈∏+∞t=0 Γt(x0) U(˜y) satisfies
(T1) in Transversality Assumption.
(ii) If A is lower semicontinuous, then v(x0) = sup
˜
y∈∏+∞t=0 Γt(x0) U(˜y) satis-
fies (T2) in Transversality Assumption.
(iii) For any aggregator A, then v(x0) = min
˜
y∈∏+∞t=0 Γt(x0) U(˜y) satisfies
(T1) and v(x0) = max
˜
y∈∏+∞t=0 Γt(x0) U(˜y) satisfies (T2), whenever themax and min above are reached for every x0.
Use will be made of the following Claim:
Claim. (i) If f : R → R is an upper semicontinuous real-valued function
and g a real-valued function on a metric compact space M , it derives
that
f( inf
x∈M
g(x)) ≥ inf
x∈M
f(g(x)).
(ii) If f : R → R is a lower semicontinuous real-valued function and g a
real-valued function on a metric compact space M , then
f
(
sup
x∈M
g(x)
)
≤ sup
x∈M
f(g(x)).
Proof. By definition, infx∈M g(x) = limn→+∞ g(xn) for some sequence (xn)
of M . Without any loss of generality, since M is compact, one can assume
that (xn) converges to some x ∈ M . The function f being upper semi-
continuous,
f( inf
x∈M
g(x)) = f( lim
n→+∞ g(xn)) ≥ limn→+∞ f(g(xn)) ≥ infx∈M f(g(x)).
The proof is similar for ii). This ends the proof of the claim. QED
Now, to prove i) of Lemma G.1, assume A upper semicontinuous, and let
˜
x ∈ XN. By definition of v,
AT (
˜
x, v(xT ))−AT (
˜
x, 0) = AT (
˜
x, inf
˜
y∈∏+∞t=0 Γt(xT )U(˜y))−A
T (
˜
x, 0).
Since A is upper semicontinuous, using Claim above, this is larger or equal
to
inf
˜
y∈∏+∞t=0 Γt(xT )A
T (
˜
x, U(
˜
y))−AT (
˜
x, 0),
also equal to
inf
˜
y∈∏+∞t=0 Γt(xT )A
T (
˜
x, U(
˜
y))−AT (
˜
x, U(a, a, ...)),
where the existence of a ∈ ∩x0∈XΓ(x0) is given by Null Assumption.
By recursivity, this is also equal to
inf
˜
y∈∏+∞t=0 Γt(xT )U(x0, . . . , xT−1,˜y)− U(x0, . . . , xT−1, a, a, . . .)
This last quantity can be made as small as one wishes for T large enough
(by biconvergence), which proves that v satisfies (T1).
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The proof of 2)ii) is symetrical.
Last, to prove for example that if
v(x0) = min
˜
y∈∏+∞t=0 Γt(x0)U(˜y)
for every x0 (note that now, A may not be u.s.c.), then v satisfies (T1), follow
the proof above. Simply note that v(xT ) can be written U(
˜
y) for some
˜
y)
(depending on T ), and the above proof can be followed without using any
infimum. This ends the proof of Lemma G.1.
Proving now Proposition 4.2.3, define, for every x0 ∈ X,
v(x0) = maxU
(+∞∏
t=1
Γt
(
x0
))
and
v(x0) = inf U
(+∞∏
t=1
Γt
(
x0
))
.
Checking first that one can apply Theorem 4.2 to prove that v∗ is the unique
solution of Bellman equation.
First, v ≤ v < +∞ and clearly, for every
˜
x ∈ Σ(x0), U(
˜
x) ∈ [v(x0), v(x0)].
Moreover, from Lemma G.1, (v, v) satisfies Transversality Assumption. One
can thus apply Proposition 3.3, which gives v∗(x0) = v∗(x0) = sup
˜
x∈Σ(x0) U(˜
x),
simply called v∗(x0) hereafter.
Secondly proving that B(v) ≤ v, and B(v) ≥ v.
To show that B(v) ≤ v, let x0 ∈ X.
B(v)(x0) = sup
x1∈Γ(x0)
A(x1, v(x1))
= sup
x1∈Γ(x0)
A
(
x1,maxU
(+∞∏
t=1
Γt(x1)
))
= sup
x1∈Γ(x0)
sup
xt+1∈Γt(x1),∀t≥1
A(x1, U(x2, x3, . . . , xn, . . .))
= sup
x1∈Γ(x0)
sup
xt+1∈Γt(x1),∀t≥1
U(x1, x2, . . . , xn, . . .)
≤ sup
xt∈Γt(x0),∀t≥1
U(x1, x2, . . . , xn, . . .)
= v(x0)
Showing now that B(v) ≥ v.
B(v)(x0) = sup
x1∈Γ(x0)
A(x1, v(x1))
= sup
x1∈Γ(x0)
A
(
x1, inf U
(+∞∏
t=1
Γt(x1)
))
≥ sup
x1∈Γ(x0)
inf
(x2,...)∈
+∞∏
t=1
Γt(x1)
A(x1, U(x2, x3, ...)
≥ sup
x1∈Γ(x0)
inf
(x2,...)∈
+∞∏
t=1
Γt(x1)
U(x1, x2, x3, ...)
≥ v(x0)
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The first inequality being a consequence of the claim above. Lastly, one is
only to prove that A is weakly continuous at v, i.e. that
f(ε) = sup
(
˜
z,
˜
x)∈Σ˜(x0)
inf
n≥0
A(z0, A(z1, A(z2, . . .
. . . , A(zn−1, v(xn)) + εn−1) + εn−2 + · · · ) + ε2) + ε1),
is upper semicontinuous (here the topology on [0, 1]N is the standard product
topology). Remark that for n > 1 fixed, the mapping which associates
A(z0, A(z1, A(z2, . . .
. . . , A(zn−1, v(xn)) + εn−1) + εn−2 + · · · ) + ε2) + ε1)
to every (n − 1)−uple (ε1, ..., εn−1) ∈ Rn−1 is upper-semicontinuous, from
upper semicontinuity of A, from upper semicontinuity of v (a consequence
of Berge theorem), and from Increasing Monotonicity Assumption. Thus,
the function which associates
A(z0, A(z1, A(z2, . . .
. . . , A(zn−1, v(xn)) + εn−1) + εn−2 + · · · ) + ε2) + ε1)
to every sequence (εk)k≥1 is also upper semicontinuous (by definition of the
product topology chosen on [0, 1]N). Passing to the infimum with respect to
n, one obtains an upper-semicontinuous function. Then from Berge theorem,
the feasibility contraint having a closed and compact graph, it is finally
proved that f is upper-semicontinuous at 0 (in fact everywwhere).
This concludes the argument of the the proof. QED
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